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REQUEST FOR FILING APPLICATION

Under Rule 53(a), (b) & (f)

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Use for Design or Utility Applications

PATENT
APPLICATION

RULE 53(f) NO DECLARATION

Assistant Commissioner of Patents
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Washington, DC 20231

Atty. Dkt.

PM 271382

M#

P9317

Client Ref

Date:

September 29, 2000

Sir:

1. This is a Request for filing a new Patent Application ☐ Design ☒ Utility) entitled:2. (Complete) Title: SECURE STORAGE OF PRIVATE KEYSwithout a filing fee or Oath/Declaration but for which is enclosed the following:3. ☒ Abstract 1 page(s).4. 20 Pages of Specification (only spec. and claims); 5. ☐ Specification in non-English language6. 28 Numbered claim(s); and7. ☒ Drawings: 5 sheet(s) ☐ 1 set informal; 8. ☒ formal of size: ☒ A4 ☐ 11"9. **DOMESTIC/INTERNATIONAL** priority is claimed under 35 USC 119(e)/120/365(c) based on the following provisional, nonprovisional and/or PCT international application(s):

Application No.	Filing Date	Application No.	Filing Date
(1)		(2)	
(3)		(4)	
(5)		(6)	

10. **FOREIGN** priority is claimed under 35 USC 119(a)-(d)/365(b) based on filing in

Application No.	Filing Date	Application No.	Filing Date
(1)		(2)	
(3)		(4)	
(5)		(6)	

11. (No.) Certified copy (copies): ☐ attached; ☐ previously filed (date)
in U.S. Application No. / filed on 12. ☐ This is a reissue of Patent No. 13. ☐ See top first page re prior Provisional, National, International application(s) (X box only if info is there and do not complete corresponding item 14 or 15.)14. ☐ **Amend the specification** by inserting before the first line -- This is a ☐ Continuation-in-Part
☐ Divisional ☐ Continuation ☐ Substitute Application (MPEP 201.09) of:14(a) ☐ National Appln. No. / filed -- (M#)14(b) ☐ International Appln. No. PCT/ filed which designated the U.S. --15. ☐ **Amend the specification** by inserting before the first line: --This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/ , filed --16. Extension to date: ☐ concurrently filed ☐ not needed ☐ previously filed

17. ☐ Prior application is assigned to _____

by Assignment recorded _____ Reel _____ Frame _____

18. ☐ Attached:

19. This application is made by the following named inventor(s) (Double check instructions for accuracy.):

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20. NOTE: FOR ADDITIONAL INVENTORS, check box ☐ and attach sheet with same information regarding additional inventors.


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NOTE: File in duplicate with 2 post card receipts (PAT-103) & attachments

APPLICATION UNDER UNITED STATES PATENT LAWS

Atty. Dkt. No. PM 271382
(M#)

Invention: SECURE STORAGE OF PRIVATE KEYS

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This is a:

- ☐ Provisional Application
- ☒ Regular Utility Application
- ☐ Continuing Application
 - ☒ The contents of the parent are incorporated by reference
- ☐ PCT National Phase Application
- ☐ Design Application
- ☐ Reissue Application
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- ☐ Substitute Specification
Sub. Spec Filed _____
in App. No. _____ / _____
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SPECIFICATION

SECURE STORAGE OF PRIVATE KEYS

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates generally to cryptographic systems, and more particularly, to securing private keys in a public key cryptographic system.

2. Description of Related Art

The increasing accessibility of public networks, such as the Internet, allow a wide variety of data to be quickly and cost effectively accessed from virtually anywhere. The Internet, for example, allows users to access databases such as web page servers from any computer connected to the Internet.

One disadvantage with using a public network or an insecure private network to access information is the possibility that sensitive or private information may be accessed, modified, or intercepted by an unauthorized party. These problems can be mitigated, however, by using public key cryptographic systems. In these systems, an authorized person can digitally sign messages to verify their source and information can be encrypted before it is transmitted over the insecure network. The receiver of the signed message will be assured that the message originated from the authorized person. The encrypted information, even if unlawfully intercepted, is not intelligible. In this manner, an insecure network may act functionally like a private and secure network.

The basic components of a public key cryptographic system include a cryptographic algorithm and two numerical codes called keys, one of which is referred to as the public key and the other the private key. To encrypt information, a user inputs a public key to the cryptographic algorithm along with the information to

be encrypted. The resultant information, encrypted with the public key, can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. For example, if a first user encrypts a message with the public key, only the holder of the private key can recover the original message. Even the first user, absent the private key, cannot decrypt the message.

Parties wishing to securely communicate with one another over an insecure network using a public key cryptographic system begin by exchanging their public keys. The sending party then encrypts its information using the second party's public key. The second party decrypts the received information using its private key. Similarly, when digitally signing a document using public key cryptographic systems, the signing party signs the document using its private key. Correctly decrypting the signature with the signing party's public key verifies the identity of the signing party.

For a public key cryptographic system to be reliable, the communicating parties must keep their respective private keys secure. A user's private key is typically stored at the user's computer. To guard against someone stealing the private key, either by unauthorized physical or logical (i.e., programmatical) access to the user's computer, conventional public key encryption systems encrypt the user's private key using a symmetric encryption algorithm that uses a single key based on a password entered by the user. The encrypted version of the private key is only secure, however, if the user uses a "strong" password. Weak passwords—passwords that are short or based on real words — are vulnerable to brute force cracking algorithms that discover a private key by decrypting the stolen but encrypted version of the private key by methodically trying a large number of possible passwords.

Strong passwords are passwords that are long enough so that a brute force attack is not likely to be able to guess the correct password. Strong passwords, although desirable from a security standpoint, are not particularly user friendly. Users do not like to type in long phrases every time they begin a secure session. Additionally, strong passwords can be difficult to remember.

Accordingly, there is a need in the art to improve the user friendliness of passwords used to protect a private key without compromising the security offered by strong passwords.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this Specification, illustrate an embodiment of the invention and, together with the description, explain the objects, advantages, and principles of the invention. In the drawings:

Fig. 1 a diagram illustrating an exemplary computer network on which concepts consistent with the present invention may be implemented;

Fig. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method for registering a private key with a key server according to methods consistent with the present invention;

Fig. 3 is a flow chart illustrating a method for accessing a user's private key that has been registered with a key server;

Fig. 4 is a flow chart illustrating a second method for registering a private key with a key server according to methods consistent with the present invention; and

Fig. 5 is a flow chart illustrating a method for accessing a user's private key.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The following detailed description refers to the accompanying drawings that illustrate the embodiments of the present invention. Other embodiments are possible and modifications may be made to the embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Therefore, the following detailed description is not meant to limit the invention. Rather the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims.

As described herein, a key protection server is connected via a network to a user's computer. The key protection server and the user's computer each store a portion of the information needed to compute the user's private cryptographic key. The user additionally protects his private key with a password, which may be a weak password. A security breach at either the key protection server or the user's computer does not jeopardize the user's private key, even to standard brute force attacks.

Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary computer network in which concepts consistent with the present invention may be implemented. The computer network includes multiple client computers 108 coupled to network 105, which may be, for example, the Internet. Client computers 108 each typically include a processor 110 operatively coupled to computer memory 111 and a display 112. Processor 110 executes program instructions stored in computer memory 111, such as cryptographic program 130.

Users 120 may use any of client computers 108 to communicate with key server 101. In general, key server 101 assists users 120 in managing their private keys.

Client cryptographic program 130, which is described in more detail below, encrypts, decrypts, and/or digitally signs information being transmitted to and received from other users 120. Additionally, client cryptographic program 130 communicates with key server 101 to securely store the private keys of users 120. Although shown as a single program, cryptographic program 130 may be a multitude of cryptographic programs, each providing part of the functionality of cryptographic program 130.

As with client computers 108, key server 101 includes at least one processor 113 and a computer memory 114. Memory 114 includes remote server cryptographic program 150, which interfaces with client computer cryptographic programs 130.

Remote server cryptographic program 150, as will be described in more detail below, stores a portion of the information needed to compute a user's private key along with additional user identifying information. Cryptographic program 130 and remote server cryptographic program 150 operate together to securely compute the user's private key in the user's computer memory 111.

Client computers 108 and key server 101 may either accept program instructions from a computer storage device (e.g., optical or magnetic disk) or from network 105. BIOS code (i.e., computer instructions) causing the system to implement the disclosed techniques may be programmed into a non-volatile portion of computer memories 111 and 114. The BIOS may be programmed when the system is manufactured or may be later delivered via a computer readable medium.

Client processors 110 and key server processor 113 can be any of a number of well known computer processors, such as processors from Intel Corporation, of Santa Clara, California. More generally, client computers 108 may be any type of

computing platform connected to a network and that interact with application programs, such as a personal digital assistant or a "smart" cellular telephone or pager.

Before a client computer can begin to securely communicate using public key encryption with another party, it first generates a public/private key pair. As mentioned, consistent with an aspect of the present invention, a portion of the information needed to compute the generated private key is stored at key server 101. Fig. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method for registering the private key with the key server 101.

The client computer begins by generating a public and a corresponding private key. (Act 201). The public key may be freely distributed. It is desirable to keep the private key, labeled as key K, as secure as possible. To this end, the user enters a password, PWD, to help protect the private key K. (Act 202). The password PWD may be of any length. In addition to generating the private key K, the client computer also generates a random number, K-PC, which is larger than the private key K. (Act 203). Generation of public/private key pairs and random numbers are well known in the art and will thus not be described further.

The client computer 108 next computes a derivative of the private key K and the random number K-PC, called K-Ser, by exclusive ORing these two numbers. (Act 204). In this manner, K-Ser, related to the private key K, is created by client 108. At this point, private key K may be deleted from memory 111 of client 108.

Client computer 108 further enhances the security of K-PC and K-Ser by encrypting them using a symmetric encryption algorithm having a key based on a hash of the user's password PWD and login name. More particularly, client computer 108 computes a hash value, Hash1, based on the user's password PWD, user name, and a fixed random value (Salt1). (Act 205). User names (also called

login names), are commonly used in the computer art to identify users to a computer or network. With Hash1 in hand, K-PC and K-Ser are “wrapped” using an encryption key based on Hash1. (Act 206). Wrapping a value refers to encrypting the value using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The encryption key used to wrap K-PC and K-Ser may be Hash1 itself, or a variation of Hash1 designed to yield an appropriate length encryption key. K-PC and K-Ser can only be unwrapped with the encryption key used to wrap them.

A second hash value, Hash2, is generated by client computer 108. (Act 207). As with Hash1, Hash2 is based on the user’s password PWD, user name, and a second fixed random value (Salt2). Salt1 and Salt2 are fixed random numbers that, once initially generated, are stored at client computer 108.

Hash1 and Hash2 may be implement by different mathematical hashing functions or the same hashing function. The PKCS #5 encryption suite, available from RSA, Inc., of Bedford, Massachusetts, includes suitable cryptographically secure hashing algorithms. In general, hashing algorithms take arbitrary strings as input, and produce an output of fixed size that is dependent on the input. Ideally, it should never be possible to derive the input data given the hash algorithm’s output. For a hashing algorithm to be cryptographically secure, it must be very difficult to find two input strings that produce the same output hash value, or to find an input string that produces a given hash value. Because Salt1 and Salt2 are different values, the values of Hash1 and Hash2 will necessarily be, to a statistical certainty, different from one another.

Having wrapped K-PC and K-Ser, client computer 108 registers with key server 101 by sending the user name, Hash2, and the wrapped version of K-Ser to key server 101. (Act 208). These values are stored at the key server.

unsuccessful attempts. If the user had not actually made these attempts, the user would be advised to change their password. After 25 unsuccessful values, not necessarily consecutive, the server may lock the account until there is some out-of-band communication with the user. The numbers 5, 25, and 1 hour are examples, and may be different in actual use.

Client computer 108, after obtaining the private key K, may delete the calculated intermediate values K-Ser, Hash1, and Hash2.

A user may want to have the server store more than one key. For example, it is common practice to use a different private/public key pair for encryption than for digital signatures. A user may use the same value of Hash2 for multiple keys. In this case, the user could request the values of K-Ser for multiple keys with a single request to the server.

A user may want to change their password PWD. To do this, the client program asks the user to enter their old password once, and their new password twice. The client program goes through the procedure described above to retrieve the user's private key using the old password. Then the client program goes through the procedure to store the private key using the new password. Server 101 could then delete the old stored values of Hash-2 and K-Ser. The server may want to have the user authenticate themselves, such as through a digital signature with the user's private key or through sending the old Hash-2 along with the new Hash-2, before the server deletes the old stored values.

With the private key storage system and method described above, even if an unauthorized party breaks into one of client computers 108 and steals the wrapped version of K-PC, Salt1, and Salt2, it would still be very difficult to derive the private K. A brute force attack, for example, even if it was able to guess the correct password,

and thus unwrap K-PC, would have no way of knowing that it had the correct K-PC without having K-Ser. If an adversary tried to test for the correct password by computing and sending values of Hash2 to the server, the server will only allow a limited number of guesses. Similarly, if security at key server 101 is compromised and K-Ser accessed, a brute force attack would not be able to derive K without K-PC.

An alternate embodiment consistent with the present invention for storing and retrieving a user's private key using a key server will now be described with reference to Figs. 4 and 5.

Fig. 4 is a flow chart illustrating a second method for registering a private key.

The client computer begins by generating a public and a corresponding private key. (Act 401). The public key may be freely distributed. It is desirable to keep the private key, labeled as key K, as secure as possible. To this end, the user enters a password, PWD, to help protect the private key K. (Act 402). The password PWD may be of any length. In addition to generating the private key K, the client computer also generates two fixed random values, Salt1 and Salt2. Salt1 and Salt2 should be relatively long, such as 160 bits in length. (Act 403).

Client computer 108 further enhances the security of K by encrypting it using a symmetric encryption algorithm having a key based on a hash of the user's password PWD and login name. More particularly, client computer 108 computes a hash value, Hash1, based on the user's password PWD, user name, and the fixed random value (Salt1). (Act 404). With Hash1 in hand, K is wrapped using an encryption key based on Hash1. (Act 405). The encryption key used to wrap K may be Hash1 itself, or a variation of Hash1 designed to yield an appropriate length

encryption key. K can only be unwrapped with the encryption key used to wrap it.

A second hash value, Hash2, is generated by client computer 108. (Act 406). As with Hash1, Hash2 is based on the user's password PWD, user name, and a second fixed random value (Salt2). Salt2 is a fixed random number that, once initially generated, is stored at client computer 108.

Having wrapped K and computed Hash2, client computer 108 registers with key server 101 by sending the user name, Hash2, and Salt1 to key server 101. (Act 407). These values are stored at the key server. At this point, private key K and Salt1 may be deleted from memory 111 of client 108. Communications between the client computer and the key server may be performed using the well known SSL (secure socket layer) protocol to further enhance security.

Salt2, and the wrapped version of K are stored at the client computer 108. Other values generated by client 108, such as Salt1, and K, are not permanently stored at client 108.

Fig. 5 is a flow chart illustrating a method for reconstructing the user's private key at client computer 108. The private key is required whenever the user would like to sign a message or read a document encrypted with the user's public key.

Client computer 108 begins by obtaining the user name and password. (Act 501). With these two values, and Salt2, client computer 108 generates Hash2. (Act 502). Hash2 and the user name are then sent to key server 101. (Act 503). If the received value for the user name and Hash2 match the values stored by the key server during registration, key server 101 responds by transmitting Salt1 back to the client computer. (Acts 504, 506). The client then generates Hash1 from the user name, the password PWD, and Salt1. (Act 507). The client then unwraps K based

on Hash1, (Act 508). In this manner, the private key K is obtained and may be used in subsequent 5public key cryptographic sessions.

If Hash2 and the user name compared in Act 304 do not match the values stored by the key server during registration, key server 101 denies access to Salt1. (Act 505).

Client computer 108, after obtaining the private key K, may delete the value of Salt1.

With the private key storage system and method described above, even if an unauthorized party breaks into one of client computers 108 and steals the wrapped version of K and Salt2, it would still be very difficult to derive the private key K. To find K, the value of Hash1 is necessary, and Hash1 can only be computed if the user's password PWD, the login name and Salt1 are known. Thus without Salt1, K cannot be unwrapped. A brute force attack to guess the value of Salt1 would be infeasible (if Salt1 is chosen to be a large enough size, such as 160 bits). If an adversary tried to test for the correct password by computing and sending values of Hash2 to the server, the server will only allow a limited number of guesses. Similarly, if security at key server 101 is compromised and Salt1 is accessed, K could not be determined without the value of the wrapped K.

As an alternative to the above-described methods, in which the user is authenticated at the remote server based on a password, a biometric device may instead be used to authenticate the user.

It will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that the embodiments as described above may be implemented in many different embodiments of software, firmware, and hardware in the entities illustrated in the figures. The actual software code or specialized control hardware used to implement the present invention is not

limiting of the present invention. Thus, the operation and behavior of the embodiments were described without specific reference to the specific software code or specialized hardware components, it being understood that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to design software and control hardware to implement the embodiments based on the description herein.

The foregoing description of preferred embodiments of the present invention provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise form disclosed. Modifications and variations are possible consistent with the above teachings or may be acquired from practice of the invention. The scope of the invention is defined by the claims and their equivalents.

WHAT IS CLAIMED:

1. A method for securing private information comprising:
calculating a first value and a second value which together are needed to derive the private information;
registering the first value with a remote server;
securely storing the second value in a local client memory that is independent of the remote server; and
deleting the first value from the local client memory.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the private information is a private key in a public/private key pair.
3. The method of claim 1, additionally including registering an authentication value with the remote server.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein a password provided by a user of the private information is needed to derive the private information in addition to the first value and the second value.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein calculating the first and second values includes:
generating a random value;
deriving the first value from the random value; and
deriving the second value from the private information and the random value.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein calculating the first and second values includes:

generating a random value as the first value;

deriving a wrapping encryption key from the first value; and

encrypting the private key with the wrapping encryption key to form the second value.

7. A method of securing private information comprising:

entering a password;

calculating a first value and a second value and storing the first value and the second value in a local client memory, the first and second values together with the password being needed to derive the private information;

calculating an authentication value from the password;

registering the first value and the authentication value with a remote key server; and

deleting the first value from the local client memory.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein calculating the first value and the second value includes:

generating a random value;

generating a first fixed value and a second fixed value;

deriving the first value from the random value, the password, a user name, and the first fixed value; and

deriving the second value from the private information, the random value, the password, the user name, and the second fixed value;

9. The method of claim 7, wherein calculating the first value and the second value includes:

generating a random value as the first value;

deriving a wrapping encryption key from the first value, the password, and a user name; and

encrypting the private key with the wrapping encryption key to form the second value.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the authentication value is calculated by:

generating a fixed value; and

deriving the authentication value from the fixed value, the password, and the user name.

11. A method of deriving private information of a user comprising:

receiving a first value from a key server located remotely from the user, the first value being related to the private information;

retrieving a second value stored on a computer system of the user; and

calculating the private information based on the first and second values.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein the calculation of the private information additionally includes using a password of the user to calculate the private information.

13. The method of claim 11, wherein the private information is a private key in a public key cryptographic system.

14. The method of claim 11, further comprising authenticating the user of the private information at the remote key server.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein the method of authenticating is using a biometric device.

16. A method comprising:
generating a public key and a corresponding private key for a public key cryptographic system;
calculating a first number based on the private key and a random number;
wrapping the first number using a symmetric encryption key derived from a password entered by a user of the private key; and
registering the wrapped version of the first number with a remote key server.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the symmetric encryption key is derived from a first hash value based on the password, a user name, and a first fixed random number

18. A computer system comprising:
a processor; and
a computer memory connected to the processor, the computer memory including a cryptographic program configured to generate a public key and a

corresponding private key for a public key cryptographic system, calculate a first number based on the private key and a random number, and wrap the first number using a symmetric encryption key derived from a password entered by a user of the private key; wherein

the wrapped version of the first number is registered with a remote server and then deleted from the computer system, the computer system retrieving the wrapped version of the first number before initiating a secure communication session using the private key.

19. The computer system of claim 18, wherein the computer memory calculates the first number by performing a logical exclusive OR of the private key and the random number.

20. The computer system of claim 18, wherein the symmetric encryption key is derived from a first hash value based on the password, a user name, and a first fixed random number.

21. The computer system of claim 20, wherein registering the wrapped version of the first number with the remote key server further includes:

transmitting the wrapped version of the first number to the remote key server;

transmitting a user name to the key server; and

transmitting a second hash value to the key server, the second hash value being based on the password, the user name, and a second fixed random number.

22. A computer readable medium containing instructions for execution by a processor, the instructions, when executed:

- generate a public key and a corresponding private key for a public key cryptographic system;
- calculate a first number based on the private key and a random number;
- wrap the first number using a symmetric encryption key derived from a password entered by a user of the private key; and
- registering the wrapped version of the first number with a remote key server.

23. The computer readable medium of claim 22, wherein the symmetric encryption key is derived from a first hash value based on the password, a user name, and a first fixed random number.

24. The computer readable medium of claim 23, wherein registering the wrapped version of the first number with the remote key server further includes:

- transmitting the wrapped version of the first number to the remote key server;
- transmitting a user name to the key server; and
- transmitting a second hash value to the key server, the second hash value being based on the password, a user name, and a second fixed random number.

25. A distributed data object stored on a plurality of computers, the distributed data object comprising:

a first component, the first component being wrapped with an encryption key based on a hash value that is based on a user password, the first component being stored on a key server computer of the plurality of computers; and

a second component, the second component being wrapped with the encryption key and stored on a client computer of the plurality of computers; wherein

the first and second components of the data object, when unwrapped with the encryption key and combined using a logical exclusive OR operation, generate a private key in a public/private key encryption pair for a user of the client computer.

26. The distributed data object of claim 25, wherein the first component is calculated from the private key and the second component.

27. The distributed data object of claim 25, wherein the first component is calculated as the logical exclusive OR of the private key and the second component.

28. The distributed data object of claim 25, wherein the second component is a random number.

ABSTRACT

To protect a private cryptographic key, two values are derived. The two values together can reconstruct the key. One value is sent to a server and deleted from the local machine. The other value is held by the local machine. To use the key, the user will enter a password, which will be used to authenticate the user to the server, and retrieve the value from the server. The password is also used to unlock the value held by the local machine. The private cryptographic key is thus protected against brute force password attacks without changing the behavior of the user.




Fig. 2




Fig. 3




Fig. 4

